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This paper considers an auction design framework in which bidders get partial
feedback about the distribution of bids submitted in earlier auctions: either bid-
ders are asymmetric but past bids are disclosed in an anonymous way or several
auctionformatsarebeingusedandthedistributionofbids,butnottheassociated
formats, is disclosed. I employ the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel
2005) to model such situations. First-price auctions in which past bids are dis-
closed in an anonymous way generate more revenues than second-price auctions
while achievingan efﬁcientoutcomeintheasymmetricprivatevaluestwo-bidder
case with independent distributions. Besides, by using several auction formats
with coarse feedback, a designer can always extract more revenues than in My-
erson’s optimal auction, and yet less revenues than in the full information case
whenever bidders enjoy ex post quitting rights and the assignment and payment
rules are monotonic in bids. These results suggest an important role of feedback
disclosure as a novel instrument in mechanism design.
Keywords. Auction design, analogy-based expectation equilibrium, manipula-
tion.
JEL classification. C72, D82, D84.
1. Introduction
Standardequilibriumapproachesofgameswith incompleteinformation(àlaHarsanyi)
assume that players know the distributions of signals held by other players as well as
those players’ strategies as a function of their signals (see Harsanyi 1995). Yet, this re-
quires a lot of knowledge that need not be easily accessible to players. Modern ap-
proaches to equilibrium rely on learning to justify this knowledge (see Fudenberg and
Levine 1998 for an overview of the literature on learning in games). But, it is in general
questionablethatenoughinformationfeedbackisavailabletotheplayersatthelearning
stage for convergence to equilibrium to be reasonably expected.
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For the sake of illustration, consider a series of ﬁrst-price auctions of similar ob-
jects (say, iPhones) involving each time new bidders of observable characteristics
i = 1 2     n(say, bidders of different age). Assume that every bidder knows his own
valuation for the object but not that of other bidders, and assume that the distribution
of valuation depends on the observable characteristic i. In many contexts, it seems un-
likely that bidders would a priori know these distributions and how they depend on i.
In such cases, bidders would look at the bids submitted in earlier similar auctions so
as to form a judgement as to what the distribution of others’ bids is likely to be in the
current auction of interest.1 In many practical auction designs such as those used on
eBay or treasury auctions, bidders have access only to the aggregate distribution of bids
in past auctions without being informed of the characteristics of the bidders of the cor-
responding bids. It is then dubious that bidders would be able to play a best response
to the actual distribution of bids of the other bidders because there is no way a bidder
canassessthedistribution ofbidsconditionalontheobservablecharacteristicbasedon
the feedback he receives. Instead, bidders are more likely to play a best response to the
conjecture that all bidders—no matter what their characteristic is—bid according to the
aggregate distribution of bids that mix the distribution of bids of all bidders. In the long
run, assuming convergence of the overall process, bidders are not playing a Nash equi-
librium, but an analogy-based expectation equilibrium with bidder-anonymous anal-
ogy partition (see Jehiel 2005 for the ﬁrst exposition of this concept and Section 2 for an
application to the private value auction setup considered here).2
As an alternative example, consider promotions in an organization. Each promo-
tion takes the form of a contest between several employees who each make a proposal
for the job task speciﬁcation in case of promotion (i.e., what they will effectively do for
the organization if promoted). Each employee has some private interest for the pro-
motion(dependingonhowhevaluespower,socialstatus,responsibilities...),whichis
known to him only. Besides, while the criterion for the current promotion (based on the
proposals)istypicallyknowntothecontestants, thecriterionmaytypicallychangefrom
one promotion to the next.3 Nash equilibrium would require that contestants know the
distributionofothers’proposalsgiventhecriterionapplicabletothecurrentpromotion.
Assuming that contestants form their expectations by looking at past promotions, this
would require that employees have access to the joint distribution of proposals and cor-
responding criterion. Yet, if employees have access only to the distribution of proposals
(and notofthecorrespondingcriterion), contestants arenotabletoplayaNashequilib-
rium. Instead, I propose that contestants play a best response (given the current crite-
rion) to the conjecture that the distribution of proposals is the same irrespective of the
1Typically, on eBay, one has access to the history of bids made in auctions of similar objects run in the
last month.
2In the language of econometrics, the model is not identiﬁable. Most applied econometricians would
particularize the model by making an extra symmetry assumption (see Athey and Haile 2006). In a sense,
this paper is assuming that bidders follow the same line as the econometricians, even though this does not
boil down to assuming that the true underlying problem is symmetric, as we shall see.
3In the formal model to be described in Section 2, the private interest should be identiﬁed with the
valuation, and the proposal (even though generally multidimensional) should be identiﬁed with the bid
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criterion (and that it corresponds to the aggregate distribution of proposals they have
access to). This is again an analogy-based expectation equilibrium with appropriately
chosen analogy partitions.
In this paper, I generalize the above two examples. I consider one-object private val-
ues auction environments in which the valuations are independently distributed across
bidders, bidders receive coarse feedback about the distribution of previous bids, and
every single bidder participates in just one auction. Speciﬁcally, I consider situations
in which, as in the ﬁrst-price auction example, only the aggregate distribution of bids
with no reference to the characteristics of bidders is disclosed, and also situations in
which, as in the promotion example, different auction formats are being used (this is
the analog of different criteria being used) and only the aggregate distribution of bids
across the various auction formats is being disclosed. Any combination of such coarse
disclosures is also allowed. The equilibrium concept that is used to describe the inter-
action of bidders with such coarse feedback disclosure—the analogy-based expectation
equilibrium—requires that bidders play a best response to the aggregate distribution of
bids, as given by the feedback they receive.
I explore whether and when it is the case that the designer is better off when bidders
play an analogy-basedexpectation equilibrium ratherthan a Nash equilibrium and how
the answer is affected by the speciﬁc forms of feedback disclosure and auction rules.
Addressing such questions opens new avenues in mechanism design. As it turns out,
providing coarse feedback about past behaviors—as considered in this paper—can en-
hance the designer’s objective, which suggests the relevance of an instrument not previ-
ously considered in mechanism design.4
To highlight the potential role of feedback disclosure in mechanism design, I as-
sume that (in addition to the format(s)) the designer is free to choose which kind of
feedback (within the class speciﬁed above) to disclose to bidders. In the promotion ex-
ample, choosing which feedback to disclose sounds natural for the designer given that
the feedback is, in principle, under the control of the organization. In the auction exam-
ple, this is an idealization that would ﬁt well if a single seller had many similar objects
to auction off over time. My framework in the auction case can more usefully be inter-
preted as providing insights as to what kind of feedback policy an auction house such as
eBay should adopt so as to increase the revenues of sellers (which in turn determine the
revenues of the auction house through the fees).
I ﬁrst assume that the main objective of the designer is welfare maximization
whereas the auxiliary goal is revenue (as is the case in many government auctions). The
main question I address with this objective in mind is, “Can the designer do better than
using a second-price auction (or equivalently an ascending-price auction) by using a
coarse feedback device?”
Intheclassicsetup(relyingonNashequilibrium), theso-calledrevenueequivalence
theorem implies that the designer can do no better. This is so because the second-price
auction induces an efﬁcient outcome and any efﬁcient mechanism that respects the
4Forarelatedinvestigationinthecontextofsymmetricﬁrst-priceauctionswithafﬁliatedsignals, seethe
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participation constraints of bidders must achieve a revenue no greater than that of the
second-price auction (see, for example, Milgrom 2004 for an exposition of the revenue
equivalence theorem).
In my setup, I show that the designer can sometimes do better, thereby illustrating
a failure of the revenue equivalence theorem when the solution concept is the analogy-
based expectation equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, in the case of two bidders with asymmetric
distributions of valuations, I show that the ﬁrst-price auction in which the designer pro-
vides as the aggregate distribution of bids feedback, with no reference to the character-
istic of the bidders (as considered above), always induces an efﬁcient outcome and al-
ways generates an expected revenue that is strictly greater than that of the second-price
auction no matter what the distributions of valuations are. I also provide conditions
ensuring that such a result holds true when there are more than two bidders.5
I next consider the case in which the designer is only interested in revenues and
Iassumethatbidderscanalwaysvetothetransactionexpost(therebylimitingthescope
for manipulation). The main question I am interested in is, “Can the designer generate
more revenues than in the classic optimal auction characterized by Myerson (1981)a n d
Riley and Samuelson (1981)?”
I show that this is always so and that the best revenue so obtained lies strictly below
the full information maximal revenue. In other words, a clever use of coarse feedback
coupled with a judicious choice of format(s) may reduce the informational rent left to
bidders even though some rent must be left to bidders.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is introduced
together with the analogy-based expectation equilibrium and the mechanism design
problem. In Section 3, the ﬁrst-price auction with bidder-anonymous feedback parti-
tion is analyzed. In Section 4, it is shown how one can generate more revenues than
in Myerson’s optimal auction. Section 5 offers a discussion, including how the paper re-
latestotheliteratureandwhatwouldhappenifthetransactionneednotbeapprovedex
post or if the designer could use shill bidders. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are given
in the Appendix.
2. Basic definitions
An object is to be auctioned off and there are n bidders i = 1     n. Each bidder i knows
his own valuation vi for the object, but not that of the other bidders j  = i. The distribu-
tion of valuations is independent acrossbidders. The valuation vi is drawn from adistri-
bution with support [c d] and (continuous) density fi(·),w h e r efi(v) > 0 for all v ∈[ c d]
and d>c≥ 0. Biddershavequasilinearpreferencesandtheyareriskneutral. Thatis, ifa
bidderwithvaluation v expectstowin theobjectwithprobability p andexpectstomake
5Such clear-cut revenue comparisons (at least in the two-bidder case) should be contrasted with the
ambiguous revenue ranking between the ﬁrst-price auction and the second-price auction obtained with
Nash equilibrium when bidders are asymmetric (see Maskin and Riley 2000).
6TheauctiondesignandfeedbackpolicyusedtoprovethatonecangostrictlybeyondMyerson’soptimal
auction revenue require the use of several (in fact two) auction formats and that bidders be informed only
of the aggregate distribution of bids over the various formats. Such auction designs do not clearly resemble
existing ones, and more work is required to map this theoretical result to practical auction design. Such a
construction may possibly shed light on why transparency need not be optimal in promotion contexts.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Manipulative auction design 189
(an expected) transfer t to the seller, his expected utility is pv − t. The seller’s valuation
is vs.
The object is auctioned off through possibly different auction formats Mk, k ∈ K =
{1     r},w h e r ef o r m a tMk is used with probability λk. Each auction format Mk (which
together with λk is chosen by the designer) is restricted to take the following form.
• Bidders i = 1     nsimultaneously submit a bid bi ∈[ 0 d].





i (b) ≤ 1,
bidder i is offered to obtain the object in exchange for a payment τk
i (b) to the
seller. The transaction takes place if after being informed of τk
i (b), bidder i ap-
proves the terms of the contract.
• For every i, k, ϕk
i (b) is a nondecreasing function of bi and a nonincreasing func-
tion of bj, j  = i; τk
i (b) is a nondecreasing functions of bi and of bj, j  = i.M o r e o v e r ,
if bi <v s,t h e nϕk
i (b) = 0.
The auction formats considered in this paper require that the bidders approve the
termsofthecontractexpost. Thatis,assumingthatbidderi withvaluationvi isdeclared
the winner with a tentative transaction price τk
i (b), there is effectively a transaction (at
price τk
i (b))o n l yi fvi >τ k
i (b), and otherwise there is no transaction and the seller keeps
the object.7
The monotonicity assumptions made on ϕk
i (b) and τk
i (b) are in line with the auc-
tion interpretation: As a bidder increases his bid, his probability of winning (weakly) in-
creases and so does the price this bidder must pay. As a competing bidder increases his
bid, the probability of winning (weakly) decreases and the price paid in case of trans-
action (weakly) increases. Moreover, the requirement that if bi <v s,t h e nϕk
i (b) = 0 is
meant to represent the idea that the valuation vs of the seller is the minimum starting
point of the auction (as the seller would refuse to sell at a price lower than vs).
It should be mentioned that the ﬁrst-price auction and the second-price auction
with reserve price no smaller than vs both belong to the above class of auctions, and
that it is always possible to pick an auction in this class that achieves Myerson’s optimal
revenue no matter what the densities fi(·) are. Moreover, the requirement that bidders
should approve the terms of the contract ex post ensures that a bidder, no matter what
bidding strategy he employs and no matter what he expects the distribution of other
bids to be, is better off participating in the auction rather than staying outside.
I have in mind situations in which bidders have no prior idea about what the densi-
ties of valuations fi(·), i ∈ I, are and in which every individual bidder participates in just
oneauction. Toformtheirexpectationsaboutthedistributionofotherbids,biddersrely
on the feedback about past play that is made available by the designer.
Speciﬁcally, when auction format Mk prevails, bidder i is assumed to be informed
of the functions ϕk
i (b) and τk
i (b) that apply to him in this format (but he need not be
informed of other characteristics of Mk; see more on this below). Thus, if bidder i with
7I also assume that there is a tiny (rather than exactly zero) cost to cancelling out the transaction. This
allows me to rule out crazy behaviors from bidders with valuations v<v s.190 Philippe Jehiel Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
valuation vi bids bi and expects the bid proﬁle b−i = (bj)j =i to be distributed according
to the random variable  b−i, his perceived expected utility in Mk is
uk




i (bi b−i)max(vi −τk
i (bi b−i) 0)
 
 
As t r a t e g yo fb i d d e ri is a family of bid functions βi = (βk
i )k, one for each auction
format Mk,w h e r eβk
i (vi) denotes bidder i’s bid in format Mk when i’s valuation is vi.8
Nashequilibriumwouldrequirethatforeach k and vi, bidder i playsabestresponse
to the actual distribution of bids of bidders j  = i in Mk.T h a ti s ,
βk





where (with some slight abuse of notation) βk
−i stands for the random variable of bids
(βk
j (vj))j =i as generated by the densities (fj(·))j =i.
As already highlighted, bidders are not assumed to know (or have access to) βk
j for
every j and k. Instead, each bidder i receives partial feedback about the distribution of
bids observed in past auctions. They play a best response to this feedback (in a sense to
be deﬁned next) and a steady state is assumed to have been reached.
Speciﬁcally, I consider the following class of partial feedback. Endow each bidder i
with a partition Pi of the set {(j k): j ∈ I and k ∈ K} referred to as the analogy partition
of bidder i. A typical element of Pi is denoted by αi and referred to as an analogy class of
bidder i. The element of Pi that contains (j k) is denoted by αi(j k). The interpretation
of Pi is that bidder i gets informed only of the empirical distribution of bids of bidders
engaged in past auctions where all bids bj submitted in Mk with (j k) ∈ αi are treated
alike (i.e., they are not distinguished).
I further assume that a steady state (in which new sets of bidders with newly drawn
valuations arrive each time) has been reached so that the empirical distributions of pre-
vious bids correspond to the actual distributions. When making his choice of strategy
in auction format Mk, bidder i is thus assumed to know only (in addition to ϕk
i (b) and
τk
i (b)) the aggregate distribution of bids in every αi. He is further assumed to play a best
response to the conjecture that bidder j in format Mk bids according to the aggregate
distribution of bids in αi(j k), the analogy class to which (j k) belongs.
Formally, let A = (Mk λk Pi)i∈I k∈K denote an auction design. The solution concept
is deﬁned as follows.
Definition 1. Ananalogy-based expectation equilibrium of A = (Mk λk Pi)i∈I k∈K is a
strategy proﬁle β = (βi)i∈I such that for every k and vi,
βk





8Strictly speaking, allowing for mixed strategies βk
i (vi) should be a distribution over bids. Yet, for my
purpose, considering pure strategies is enough.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Manipulative auction design 191
where βk
−i = (βk
j )j =i and βk
j is the aggregate distribution of bids in αi(j k).T h a ti s ,βk
j
is the distribution of bids that assigns weight λk /
 
(j   k  )∈αi(j k)λk   to the distribution
βk 
j  (vj ) asgeneratedbythedensity fj (·) forevery (j  k ) ∈ αi(j k), andthedistributions
βk
j , j  = i, are perceived by bidder i to be independent of each other.
Remarks. (i) It should be mentioned that the feedback received by bidders is about the
distribution of individual bids and not about the distribution of bid proﬁles.9 (ii) The
analogy-based expectation equilibrium was ﬁrst introduced in Jehiel (2005) for exten-
sive form games and in Jehiel and Koessler (2008) for static games of incomplete infor-
mation. It is further interpreted in the context of private value auctions in Section 2.2,
and it is related to other approaches in the literature, in particular, the self-conﬁrming
equilibrium in Section 5.1.
Various objectives for the designer are considered. The ﬁrst objective is a lexico-
graphic criterion with welfare ranked ﬁrst and revenues ranked second. The second ob-
jective is the seller’s expected utility as measured by the revenue she gets when there is a
transaction and her valuation vs when there is no transaction. In all cases, the designer
is assumed to be risk neutral. She assesses an auction design A = (Mk λk Pi)i∈I k∈K ac-
cording to the expected value of her objective, assuming that bidders behave according
to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of A.10
2.1 Examples of analogy partitions and auction designs
The class of analogy partitions considered in Deﬁnition 1 is quite large, as it allows for
both the bundling of bidders and the bundling of formats in any possible way. For the
possibility results that show that the designer can do strictly better than using the ﬁnest
analogy partition, I either consider the bundling of bidders (Propositions 1 and 2)o r
the bundling of formats (Proposition 3), but not a combination of the two. The more
general formulation allowed by Deﬁnition 1 is useful for the impossibility result (Propo-
sition4),expressingthatthefullinformationbenchmarkisastrictupperboundonwhat
the designer can hope to achieve whatever the manipulation.
Speciﬁcally, the following classes of auction designs with public feedback (all Pi are
t h es a m ea c r o s si) play a central role in the analysis of Propositions 1, 2,a n d3.
Class 1: Bidder-anonymous analogy partition. I nt h i sc a s e ,t h e r ei so n l yo n ea u c -
tion format, and the feedback is about the aggregate distribution of bids across
all bidders. That is, K ={ 1} and for all i ∈ I, Pi ={
 
j∈I{(j 1)}}. For example, the
9Accordingly, every bidder i treats every bidder j’s distribution of bids, j  = i, as being independent of
each other. This ﬁts in well when bidders do not have access (or pay attention to) whether the past bids
they observe were submitted at the same or different times.
10As in Myerson (1981), one also implicitly assumes that the designer can choose the analogy-based
expectation equilibrium she likes best. Yet, which analogy-based expectation equilibrium is played turns
out to be inessential for the main results provided weakly dominated strategies are never played.192 Philippe Jehiel Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
object could be sold through a ﬁrst-price auction and bidders would receive feed-
back about the aggregate distribution of bids with no reference to the characteris-
tics of the bidders who generated the various bids. This is the situation studied in
Section 3.
Class 2: Format-anonymous analogy partition. In this case, bidders know the aggre-
gate distribution of bids across the different auction formats Mk, k ∈ K,b u tt h e y
differentiate the distribution of bids for the various bidders i ∈ I. That is, for all
i ∈ I, Pi ={
 
k∈K{(j k)}}j∈I. This situation corresponds to the contest application
mentioned in the Introduction a n di ti sc o n s i d e r e di nSection 4.
2.2 Interpretation
The interpretation of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium is that it stands for the
limiting outcome of a learning process in which (1) at every stage there is a new auction
and new bidders of observable characteristics i ∈ I,11 (2) auction format Mk is used with
frequency λk, and (3) a bidder with characteristic i receives as feedback the aggregate
empirical distribution of past bids in every αi.12 If behaviors stabilize in such a learn-
ing process, it must be to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium, provided bidders
consider the simplest theory that is consistent with the feedback they receive.
The mechanism design perspective considered in this paper corresponds to the ide-
alization that a single designer can optimize on the auction formats Mk, their frequen-
cies λk, and the analogy partitions Pi provided to bidders, and that behaviors have sta-
bilized to a corresponding analogy-based expectation equilibrium of A. As mentioned
in the Introduction, such a view is appropriate in situations in which a single seller re-
peatedly sells similar objects or in situations in which a single organization repeatedly
organizes contests for promotion. It may also be useful to understand the incentives of
an auction house such as eBay, which is obviously interested in increasing the sellers’
revenues (through the fees they generate), and which can control both the formats and
the feedback about past auctions that is disclosed to bidders.
The approach developed in this paper has a non-Bayesian element in the sense that
upon learning the coarse feedback the designer reports to them, bidders do not update
their belief about the distribution of others’ bids based on some (possibly subjective)
prior. Instead, bidders are assumed to consider the simplest theory consistent with the
feedback they receive: They play a best response to the conjecture that the distribution
ofbidsisuniformlythesameoverthevarious(j k)thatarebundledinthesameanalogy
class.13 I believe this is a natural assumption in many practical situations of interest in
which(1)subjectswouldhavenootherdatathanthefeedbacktheyreceivetoformtheir
11Theproﬁleofbidders’characteristicsisassumedtostaythesamethroughouttheprocess(seeSection5
for some elaboration on the case in which the number of bidders may vary stochastically).
12That is, a bidder with characteristic i is informed of the aggregate empirical distribution of past bids
{bk
j  (j k)∈ αi} with no reference to which (j k) generated the bid.
13Technically speaking, the analogy-based expectation equilibrium can be viewed as a reﬁnement of
some variant of the self-conﬁrming equilibrium in which bidders adopt the “simplest” conjecture as just
described; see elaborations in Section 5.1.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Manipulative auction design 193
prior,14 and (2) thefunctions ϕk
j and τk
j thatgovern bidder j’s incentive in format Mk are
either the same across all (j k) that belong to the same analogy class or they are not
known to subjects with characteristic i, i  = j.15 In such situations, it would seem rather
hard (in fact impossible) for subjects to understand how the distribution of bids varies
across different (j k) that belong to the same analogy class simply based on the aggre-
gate empirical distribution they are informed about: assuming that the distribution is
the same across these various (j k) seems focal and I propose it gives a good account
for bidders’ mode of thinking in such situations.
2.3 Preliminaries
A few preliminary observations follow. First, by picking a single auction format M and
by adopting the ﬁnest analogy partition, the designer can always replicate the revenue
generatedin M whenbehaviorsareassumedtobegovernedbyNashequilibrium. Thus,
if the designer seeks to maximize revenues, she can always achieve a revenue at least as
large as Myerson’s (1981) optimal revenue. The question is whether she can achieve
larger revenues.
Second, consider an auction format M in which bidder i has a dominant strategy.
Then in any auction design including format M, an analogy-based expectation equilib-
rium requires that bidder i plays his dominant strategy in M (remember that bidders
are informed of the allocation rule and the payment rule that applies to them in the for-
mat they are in). This is a straightforward observation, since bidder i ﬁnds his strategy
best no matter what his expectation about the distribution of others’ bids is and thus no
matter how the auction design is further speciﬁed.
Third, one of the auction designs that is studied falls in the following class. There
is one auction format M, which respects the anonymity of bidders. That is, consider
two bid proﬁles b and b  obtained by permuting the bids of players i and j.T h e n
ϕi(b) = ϕj(b ) and τi(b) = τj(b ),a n df o ra l lm  = i j, ϕm(b) = ϕm(b ), τm(b) = τm(b ).
Consider the bidder-anonymous analogy partition deﬁned above, and call A the cor-
responding auction design. One can relate the analogy-based expectation equilibria
of A to the Nash Bayes equilibria of the game  ba(A) deﬁned by the auction format
M in which, for each i, the distribution of bidder i’s valuation has the average density
f(vi) =
 
i∈j fj(vi)/n instead of fi(vi).
Claim 1. A symmetric strategy proﬁle is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of A
if and only if it is a Bayes Nash equilibrium of  ba(A).
Fourth, another class of auction designs A considered below is such that the various
auction formats Mk in A satisfy ϕk
i (bi b−i) = ϕi(bi b−i) for all k ∈ K (for example, in all
formats, the object is allocated to the player who submitted the highest bid). When the
14This in particular requires that bidders have no prior knowledge about the densities fi, not even about
the frequencies λk.
15In the ﬁrst-price auction with bidder-anonymous analogy partition, the former property applies (φk
j
and τk
j are the same across all bidders). It may be argued that in the contest for promotion example men-
tioned in the Introduction, the latter property is often met given that the criteria used for different promo-
tions are often not very transparent to outsiders.194 Philippe Jehiel Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
format-anonymous analogy partition prevails, one can relate the analogy-based expec-
tation equilibria of such auction designs A to the Nash Bayes equilibria of the following
game referred to as  fa(A).
Game  fa(A). Each bidder i (simultaneously) submits a bid bi. The object is assigned to
bidder i with probability ϕi(bi b−i). Prior to bidding, bidder i is privately informed of
his valuation vi drawn from fi(·) and of his method of payment k deﬁned by τk
i (bi b−i).
The methods of payment k are identically and independently drawn across bidders and
every bidder i is subject to the method of payment k with probability λk.16
Claim2. Suppose that the format-anonymous analogy partitions prevail and that in all
auction formats Mk of A, ϕk
i (bi b−i) = ϕi(bi b−i) for all k ∈ K and i ∈ I.T h e nas t r a t e g y
proﬁle β is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of A if and only if it is a Bayes Nash
equilibrium of  fa(A).
3. Efficiency and revenues
Assume the designer’s valuation vs is 0 and that the designer is interested in both efﬁ-
ciencyandrevenues,andsupposethattheprimaryobjectiveofthedesignerisefﬁciency
while revenue is only the secondary objective. In the standard Myerson’s paradigm, the
so-calledrevenueequivalenceresultholds. Thatis,iftwomechanismsresultinthesame
allocation rule and the expected payment made by any bidder i with minimal valuation
vi = c is 0, then both mechanisms must yield the same revenues. Since an efﬁcient out-
come can be achieved by a second-price auction SPA, the standard approach (i.e., re-
lying on Nash equilibrium) concludes that the designer can do no better than using a
SPA.
I now observe that, within the framework introduced in Section 2, the designer can
sometimes achieve strictly larger revenues (than that obtained through the SPA) while
still preserving efﬁciency, thereby illustrating a failure of the allocation equivalence in a
manipulative auction design setup. Besides, this gain in revenues is achieved by using a
fairly standard auction format (with the bidder-anonymous analogy partition).
Proposition 1. Consider a two-bidder i = 1 2 auction setup with asymmetric distribu-
tions (F1(·)  = F2(·) on a set of strictly positive measure). There is a unique analogy-based
expectation equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction with bidder-anonymous analogy parti-
tion. Moreover, this analogy-based expectation equilibrium induces an efﬁcient outcome















c xf(x)dx/F(v), f(x)= (f1(x)+f2(x))/2 and F(v)=
  v
c f(x)dx.17
16Comparedto the trueauction design, the difference is that the methods of paymentare independently
distributed across bidders in  fa whereas they are (perfectly) correlated in  .
17The function β(·) is the equilibrium bid function in a symmetric two-bidder ﬁrst-price auction with
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What is the intuition for the above result? First, observe that the use of the bidder-
anonymous analogy partition leads the bidders (whatever their characteristic) to best
respond to the same distribution of bids, which given the anonymous character of the
ﬁrst-price auction, ensures efﬁciency. Second, the use of the bidder-anonymous anal-
ogy partition leads the bidders to feel that they are in competition with a ﬁctitious bid-
der who has a distribution of valuations that is the average distribution between the
distributions of the various bidders (this essentially follows from Claim 1 above). In the
two-bidder case, the price level in the second-price auction is determined by the low-
est valuation, hence by the weak bidder. Roughly, the manipulation generated by the
bidder-anonymous analogy partition enhances revenues because it makes the strong
bidder feel that the weak bidder is less weak than he really is.
When there are more than two bidders, the ﬁrst-price auction with bidder-
anonymous analogy partition remains efﬁcient, but the revenue comparison with the
second-price auction can go either way, depending on the form of the asymmetry of the
distributions.18 The following result in which RSPA denotes the expected revenue gener-
ated in the second-price auction with densities of valuations fi(·), i ∈ I,a n dR denotes
the expected revenue generated in the ﬁctitious second-price auction with symmetric
densities of valuations fi(v) ≡ f(v)= (f1(v)+f2(v)+···+fn(v))/n provides a general-
ization of Proposition 1 to the n-bidder case.
Proposition 2. Consider an n-bidder setup and assume that R ≥ RSPA.T h e r e i s a
unique analogy-based expectation equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction with bidder-
anonymous analogy partition. Moreover, this analogy-based expectation equilibrium in-
ducesanefﬁcientoutcomeanditgeneratesastrictly higherrevenuethanthesecond-price
auction.
Proposition 2 is proven by noting that (1) the revenues in the second-price auction
or in the ﬁrst-price auction with symmetric densities coincide (this is the standard rev-
enueequivalenceresult)andthat(2)theexpectedrevenueintheﬁrst-priceauctionwith
bidder-anonymous analogy partition is strictly above the expected revenue in the ﬁrst-
priceauctionwithsymmetricdensitiesofvaluationsf(v)= (f1(v)+f2(v)+···+fn(v))/
n where the latter result follows because (i) bidders employ the same strategy in both
cases (by Claim 1) and (ii) the distribution of highest valuation in the asymmetric
case ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of highest valuation in the
18To see that revenues can go either way, consider ﬁrst a situation with two bidders whose distribution
of valuations is concentrated around d and a third bidder whose distribution of valuation is concentrated
around c. It is readily veriﬁed that the ﬁrst-price auction with bidder-anonymous feedback partition gen-
erates less revenues than the second-price auction (which achieves a revenue approximately equal to d).
Consider next a situation with one bidder whose distribution of valuations is concentrated around d while
other bidders have a distribution of valuations concentrated around c. The ﬁrst-price auction with bidder-
anonymous feedback partition generates more revenues than the second-price auction (which generates a
revenue very close to c). Thus the revenue comparison can go either way.196 Philippe Jehiel Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
symmetriccase. WhileR ≥ RSPA alwaysholdsinthetwo-biddercase(therebyexplaining
why Proposition 1 holds with no restriction on f1(·) and f2(·)), this need not be so in the
more than two-bidder case.19 20
The above insights (Propositions 1 and 2) are distinct even though related to My-
erson’s insight about how to increase revenues in asymmetric auctions. An important
implication of Myerson’s analysis is that in the asymmetric case, competition between
bidders should be biased in favor of weak bidders so as to increase revenues. The net
effect of such biased auctions is that some inefﬁciencies are induced, letting the weak
bidder sometimes win the object. As Proposition 1 (and to some extent Proposition 2)
illustrates, the use of the bidder-anonymous feedback partitions allows one, in some
cases, to symmetrize (a bit) the competition without sacriﬁcing on efﬁciency. Of course,
this is achieved by moving away from the Nash equilibrium paradigm, which the use of
partial feedback permits.21
Comment. Insomeapplications, thedistribution ofwinning bidsasopposed totheag-
gregate distribution of all bids is available to bidders. From this feedback, bidders can
compute a best response strategy based on the assumption that all bidders bid accord-
ing to the same distribution (this might be argued to be the simplest conjecture in this
case). Applied to the asymmetric ﬁrst-price auction format, the analog of Claim 1 would
reveal that in this case bidders would bid as if the distribution of valuations of each bid-
der were F(v)= (
 n
i=1Fi(v))1/n.22 It is interesting to note that in this case, no matter
how many bidders are around, revenues would be higher in the ﬁrst-price auction (in
which only the winning bids are observed) than in the second-price auction.23
19Intuitively, one would expect to have R ≥ RSPA when there is one stronger bidder who is facing sym-
metrically weak bidders, but the required notion of strong bidder does not boil down to the ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance relation in the distributions of valuations.
20Itshouldalsobenotedthatwhenthedistributionsofvaluationsarenearlythesameacrossbidders(say
the cumulative functions differ up to ε), then the revenues of the two auction designs differ according to
a smaller magnitude (of order ε2). When the distributions are very asymmetric, the difference of revenues
can be quite substantial. For example, in the two-bidder case considered in Proposition 1, assume that the
distribution of valuations of one bidder is concentrated around d, whereas the distribution of valuations
of the other bidder is concentrated around c. In this case, the ﬁrst-price auction with bidder-anonymous
feedback partition provides a revenue of (3c +d)/4, which should be compared with the revenue c of the
second-priceauction. Clearly, as d getslargerelativeto c, the revenuegain, (d −c)/4, canbequitesubstan-
tial in such asymmetric setups.
21There is some experimental evidence that in asymmetric ﬁrst-price auctions, the observed bidding
strategy is less asymmetric than Nash equilibrium requires (see Güth et al. 2005). Such an experimental
ﬁnding is consistent with the view that bidders when considering which bid to submit may look at previous
bidswithoutpayingattentiontothestrengthofthebidderwhosubmittedthebid(whichwasmodeledhere
through the apparatus of the bidder-anonymous analogy partition).
22Indeed, symmetry implies that all bidders bid according to the same increasing bid function. Thus,
only the bid of the highest valuation bidder would be observed, thereby providing the desired result.
23TheanalogofStep2intheproofofProposition1isTheorem1inCantillon(2008),andStep3holdswith
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4. Optimal auctions
Assume now that the designer seeks to maximize her expected payoff as measured by
the revenue she gets when there is transaction and her valuation vs when there is no
transaction. Proposition 3 comprises our ﬁrst main observation.24
Proposition3. Thelargestexpectedpayoffthatthedesignercanachieveinamanipula-
tive auction design is strictly larger than her expected payoff in Myerson’s optimal auction
(denoted by RM).
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. Myerson’s optimal auction can always
be implemented in such a way that every bidder has a (weakly) dominant strategy and
expostquittingrightsofbiddersarefulﬁlled(thinkofthesecond-priceauctionwithwell
chosen reserve price in the symmetric regular case). One can now think of an auction
design in which this auction format—call it Myerson design (MD)—is mixed with a little
bit of ﬁrst-price auction (FPA) with vs reserve price, and bidders get to know only the
aggregatedistributionofbidsoverthetwoauctionformats. Informat MD,thestrategies
are the same as in the standard case (because bidders have a weakly dominant strategy
in MD). In format FPA, bidders play a best response to the aggregate distribution of bids
over the two formats. For many choices of MD, this construction need not induce an
expectedpayofftothesellerthatishigherthanRM.25 Buttherearemanyvariantsof MD
in which submitted bids are ﬁrst monotonically transformed before the original format
is applied. For a suitable choice of such a variant, the construction leads bidders in FPA
to bid very aggressively because they are led to think that by shading their bid too much,
the chance of winning in FPA gets too small. In the limit, a bidder with valuation v may
be induced to bid very close to v whenever v>v s. Given that such bidding strategies in
FPA induce an expected payoff to the seller that is close to the full information optimal
expectedpayoff RF = E(maxi(vi vs)) andgiventhat RF >R M,theresultofProposition3
follows.
Proposition 3 establishes that the designer can do better than using Myerson’s opti-
mal auction (with ﬁne analogy partitions), but how much can she gain? Clearly, the best
that she can hope to get in auction designs with ex post quitting rights cannot exceed
the maximal full information expected payoff RF = E(maxi(vi vs)). This trivially follows
from the observation that a winner of the auction would always object if he were asked
topay morethanhisvaluation. As itturns out, thedesigner’sbestexpected payoffin our
manipulative design setup lies strictly below RF.
Proposition4. Thebestexpectedpayoffthatthedesignercanachieveinamanipulative
auction design with ex post quitting rights is strictly smaller than the full information
expected payoff RF if c<v s <d.
24By inspecting the proof of Proposition 3, one can see that all analogy-based expectation equilibria (not
employing weakly dominated strategies) of the auction design considered there are such that the designer
obtains higher revenues than in Myerson’s optimal auction. Thus, the conclusion of Proposition 3 would
hold under the stronger full implementation requirement (provided one restricts oneself to equilibria not
employing weakly dominated strategies).
25Itcanbechecked,forexample,thatinthecaseofuniformdistributions,amixofsecond-priceauctions
and ﬁrst-price auctions would have no effect on revenues.198 Philippe Jehiel Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
In the proof of Proposition 3, some (Myerson-optimal) mechanism MD imple-
mentable in (weakly) dominant strategy was mixed with a little bit of ﬁrst-price auction
with reserve price vs, FPA, and the seller’s expected payoff obtained in FPA was shown
to be close to RF. However, such a construction requires that the frequency with which
FPA is used is set sufﬁciently small. As one increases the frequency of FPA, the manipu-
lation loses its force and, of course, in the limit as the designer almost always picks FPA,
one gets the standard seller’s expected payoff generated in the ﬁrst-price auction with
reserve price vs, which following Myerson’s analysis cannot be greater than RM.
What Proposition 4 establishes is that within the class of mechanisms under study
one can never reach RF whatever the manipulation. This observation is of particular
interest because if the designer could freely choose the belief of bidders (with no con-
straint), she could get a payoff arbitrarily close to RF (see the arguments surrounding
Proposition 7). Thus, Proposition 4 establishes that there is some limitation to manipu-
lation imposed by the requirement that the feedback should be correct (even if coarse).
To get an intuition for Proposition 4, think of a symmetric scenario in which the
auction design A uses the format-anonymous feedback partition. To get close to RF,i t
would be required that, in all auction formats Mk used in A, every bidder with valuation
v>v s pays a price close to his valuation when he wins. This implies that every bidder
should perceive making almost zero proﬁt.26 Yet a bidder with valuation v   d can al-
ways consider submitting a bid βk((d +vs)/2) in format Mk, and he should expect there
to win and make a payment no more than (d +vs)/2, thereby making a net gain of no
less than (d −vs)/2 > 0 whenever other bids bj are smaller than βk((d +vs)/2).27
Now, itisnotaprioriclearwhatperceivedprobabilitybidder i attachesinformat Mk
to the event that all bj, j  = i, are smaller than βk((d +vs)/2). But one can always
rank the formats Mk by increasing order of βk((d +vs)/2). For those formats Mk∗ such
that βk∗
((d +vs)/2) is above the median of βk((d +vs)/2) (in the distribution in which
βk((d +vs)/2) has probability λk), it is clear that in the format-anonymous analogy par-
tition, this perceived probability is no less than 1
2 Pr(maxj =ivj <( d+vs)/2).
A contradiction is obtained given that, in format Mk∗, a bidder with valuation v   d
cannot perceive his payoff from following βk∗
(d) (this should be approximately 0)t ob e
strictly smaller than his payoff from following βk∗
((d +vs)/2) (this has been shown to
be no less than 1
2(d −vs)/2Pr(maxj =ivj <( d+vs)/2), which is strictly positive).
Comments. (1)FromtheproofofProposition4,ifvs ≤ c,itisnotclearwhetherasimilar
conclusion arises, because it is not then a priori guaranteed that for the full information
payoff to arise, a bidder should necessarily perceive making negligible proﬁt. It should
be noted though that with the additional requirement that in every format Mk,t h ep a y -
ment made by the winner should lie in between the largest and the second largest bid,
26The perceived payoff might a priori differ from the actual one due to the manipulative character of the
design. To establish this, I make use of vs >cand of the monotonicity of τk(bi b−i), but I suspect this holds
much more generally.
27This is because in format Mk, the actual bid of bidder i with valuation v<( d+vs)/2 is βk(v), and a
bidder with valuation (d +vs)/2 should win and pay a price approximately equal to his valuation whenever
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thenthesameconclusionasinProposition4wouldariseevenifvs <c,becausetherules
of the formats would imply that it is weakly dominated to bid above one’s own valuation
(and this property can easily be used to establish that bidders cannot perceive making
signiﬁcant gains if RF is to be achieved). (2) If the designer were allowed to commit
to offering positive payments to losers and if the payments from the winner were not
assumed to be monotonic in bids, then the designer could get a revenue close to RF
while still preserving the ex post participation constraints of bidders.28 The restriction
on mechanisms (i.e., not allowing positive payments to losers and imposing that pay-
ments from winners be monotonic in bids) can then be thought of as resulting from the
regulatory desire to protect bidders from manipulation.
5. Discussion
5.1 Related literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, the concept used in this pa-
per follows Jehiel (2005), Jehiel and Koessler (2008), and Ettinger and Jehiel (2010)w h o
deﬁne the analogy-based expectation equilibrium for extensive form games of com-
plete information, static games of incomplete information, and multistage games of
incomplete information, respectively. The analogy partitions considered in this paper
are slightly less general than those considered in Jehiel and Koessler (2008)e x c e p tf o r
the fact that bidder i’s own bids can be lumped together with others’ bids in bidder i’s
analogy partition.29 The main novelty of theapproachpursued hereis thatthefeedback
partitionsareviewedasachoicemadebythedesigner. Thatis, theyarenotexogenously
given as in Jehiel (2005)o rJehiel and Koessler (2008).30
28To see this, consider a symmetric two-bidder scenario in which bidders’ valuations are identically dis-
tributed on (c d). Consider an auction design with format-anonymous analogy partition and two formats
M and M used in equal proportion. In format M, the equilibrium bids lie in [0 d]; in format M,t h ee q u i l i b -
rium bids lie in {0}∪[d 2d]. In each format, a bidder with negative valuation bids 0 in equilibrium. In both
M and M, the bidder with highest bid wins the auction if this bid is strictly positive. In M,i fbi ∈ (0 d)for
i = 1 2, the winner pays his own bid and the loser receives no transfer. In M,i fbi ∈{ 0}∪[ d 2d] for i = 1 2,
the winner i∗ pays bi∗ − d and the loser receives no transfer. The idea is to augment the transfers in M and
M tocoverallbidproﬁleconﬁgurations, evenforbidrealizationsthatneveroccurintherespectiveformats.
Soin M,a(losing)biddersubmittingbi ∈ (0 d)isofferedapromiseoftransferh(bi)ifbj ∈ (d 2d),andinM,
a (winning) bidder submitting bi ∈ (d 2d) is offered a transfer h(bi) if bj ∈ (0 d).B ys u i t a b l ec h o i c e so fh
and h, one can ensure that for vi > 0, bidding β(vi) = vi in M and bidding β(vi) = vi +d in M is an analogy-
based expectation equilibrium. [For example, in the uniform distribution case, h(b) = b2/(2d)− bc/d and
h(b) = (b−d)2/(2d)−(b−d)c/d. These functions are determined so that the expected perceived transfers
correspond to those that would be made in a SPA with 0 reserve price.] With such bidding strategies, the
expected revenues generated in each format are RF, and thus the designer gets RF in expectation.
29Asalreadymentioned,suchanextensionisparticularlyadaptedifeachindividualbidder i participates
in just one auction.
30By assuming that the designer can control the analogy classes of the bidders, this paper takes the more
rational interpretation of the concept, that is, assuming that players make maximal use of the information
provided to them. In Jehiel (2005), it is alternatively suggested that an analogy-based expectation equilib-
rium might arise because players may not pay attention to all of the details of their past experiences, which
amounts to a bounded rationality interpretation of the concept.200 Philippe Jehiel Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
The analogy-based expectation equilibrium has a close relationship to some variant
of the self-conﬁrming equilibrium in which bidder i would receive as signal the aggre-
gate distribution of bids in αi for the various αi ∈ Pi (see Fudenberg and Levine 1998 for
a general presentation of the self-conﬁrming equilibrium).
Speciﬁcally, suppose at the end of an auction round described by the format Mk,
and the proﬁle of bids and the proﬁle of valuations (b v k), subjects of population i
receive as feedback various signals yz
si(b v k)∈[ 0 d] for z = 1     n(si k)and si ∈ Si,
where n(si k)denotes the number of signals of type si received when the format is Mk.



















is the empirical frequency with which a signal ysi falls in X for every X ⊆[ 0 d].As e l f -
conﬁrming equilibrium allows bidders i to entertain subjective views about λ and β,
but it requires that bidders play best responses given these subjective views and that the
empirical frequencies as computed from the subjective views coincide with the correct
empirical frequencies of ysi as generated by λ and β. The formal statement follows.
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standard that several realizations of signals of type si would be observed in a given auc-
tion round. It is also nonstandard to require the consistency of the conjectures only
with respect to the marginal distributions of ysi (as expressed in (1)) as opposed to the
joint distribution over all signals received by player i. These differences are in part moti-
vated by the fact that I have in mind situations in which an individual player plays only
once, whereas the literature that introduced the self-conﬁrming equilibrium focused on
situations in which players would play many times.31
Equipped with this notion of self-conﬁrming equilibrium, by identifying si with an
analogyclassαi andidentifyingthevariousyr
si(b v k t)withthevariousbj informatMk
such that (j k) ∈ αi, it is readily veriﬁed that an analogy-based expectation equilibrium
(Deﬁnition 1) is a self-conﬁrming equilibrium given this signal structure.
31Requiring only the consistency of the marginal distributions corresponds to the idea that players do
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As was anticipated in Section 2.2, an analogy-based expectation equilibrium is a
selection of self-conﬁrming equilibrium,32 the one in which the theory or conjecture
adoptedbybiddersisthesimplestinthesensethattheirtheoryhasthecoarsestmeasur-
abilitypropertywhilebeingconsistentwiththefeedback.33 Moreprecisely,theanalogy-
based expectation equilibrium under the stipulation that player i best responds to the
conjecture that for every (j k) ∈ αi, the distribution of bids of bidder j in format Mk
coincides with the aggregate distribution of bids in αi, is such that player i’s theory
about the play of bidder j in Mk is the same across all (j k) ∈ αi. That is, identifying the
state space of theories with {(j k) j ∈ I k∈ K}× r,w h e r e r is the r-dimensional sim-
plex (representing probability distributions over the various formats Mk, k = 1     r),
player i’s theory in an analogy-based expectation equilibrium is measurable with re-
spect to his analogy partition, and any theory that is consistent with the feedback would
have to be at least as ﬁne.34
The literature on self-conﬁrming equilibrium has not considered feedback from the
players as a design issue, with the notable exception of Esponda (2008a). Esponda con-
siders ﬁrst-price auctions in which the same bidders get involved over sequences of
auctions, and get information about the joint distribution of highest bids (and possibly
second-highestbids)andtheirownvaluationandbid. Inasymmetricﬁrst-priceauction
with private and afﬁliated values he shows that symmetric self-conﬁrming equilibria (of
the static auction) generate at least as much revenue as the Nash equilibrium.
The main common aspect of the two papers is that the solution concept that we use
is not Nash equilibrium, but some concept related to the self-conﬁrming equilibrium,
and that it is applied to a mechanism design question. Yet, there are several important
differences between Esponda (2008a) and this paper that I now discuss.
First, by allowing for a large class of auction formats, I am able to place my analysis
in the context of the optimal auction design literature (Myerson 1981), which would not
have been possible if I were to conﬁne myself to ﬁrst-price auctions. Second, motivated
by some applications such as eBay, I have considered here a case in which fresh bidders
arrive each time, which requires amending the usual deﬁnition of self-conﬁrming equi-
librium (see Deﬁnition 2). More importantly, I consider a reﬁnement of self-conﬁrming
equilibrium based on simplicity considerations. In general, when one looks at all self-
conﬁrming equilibria, it is hard to develop clear-cut comparative statics regarding the
effect of the feedback (in particular, because the Nash equilibrium is always a self-
conﬁrming equilibrium whatever the feedback). For example, in the symmetric context
studied by Esponda (2008a), to obtain clear-cut comparative statics, he had to restrict
32Dekel et al. (2004) show that in private value settings such as the one in this paper, a self-conﬁrming
equilibrium coincides with a Nash equilibrium whenever players can observe the actions of the players. An
analogy-based expectation equilibrium in my setup may differ from Nash equilibrium because bidders do
not observe other bidders’ actions separately in each format Mk in which they may participate.
33While such a selection should be the subject of empirical test, the experiment in Huck et al. (2011),
gives some support to this selection, even though not in an auction setup.
34Observe that this implies that no theory about λ need be speciﬁed in an analogy-based expectation
equilibrium, which is not so in most other self-conﬁrming equilibria (as soon as the conjecture of the dis-
tribution of bids is not the same for (j k) and (j  k ) in the same analogy class, some theory about λk/λk 
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himself to symmetric self-conﬁrming equilibria, as it is not true that his result would
hold if asymmetric self-conﬁrming equilibria were considered. But, in general, one has
to provide some motivation for the chosen restriction.35 In the research started in Jehiel
(2005) and continued in this paper, I propose looking at the selection in which players
adopt the simplest theory consistent with the feedback they receive (in a sense made
precise above), and one might argue that the simplicity criterion is a common theme of
the entire literature on bounded rationality (see, for example, Simon 1955), thereby sug-
gesting some motivation for the chosen selection. Equipped with such a selection, I was
able to obtain clear-cut comparisons because essentially the chosen selection allowed
me to have a comparable predictive power whatever the feedback (which is not so if one
works with the entire set of self-conﬁrming equilibria).
Some other equilibrium approaches that move away from Nash equilibrium (and
thus permit erroneous expectations) have been proposed in the recent past. These in-
clude the cursed equilibrium of Eyster and Rabin (2005) and the behavioral equilibrium
of Esponda (2008b). These approaches shed new light on the winner’s curse and on
the possibility of trade in adverse selection problems. Yet, in private values setting such
as the one considered here, these approaches coincide with Nash equilibrium and as
such are not closely related to the present study (see Jehiel and Koessler 2008 for a dis-
cussion of the link between the cursed equilibrium and the analogy-based expectation
equilibrium in general Bayesian games).
There is also a strand of literature concerned with learning in mechanism design.
ThisstrandincludesamongothersCabrales (1999)andCabralesandSerrano(2007)(see
the latter for a more comprehensive review of that strand of literature). A typical ques-
tion addressed in this literature concerns equilibrium selection when there are several
Nash equilibria and whether the choice of mechanism may induce good convergence
properties of the corresponding learning process. The approach pursued here is com-
plementary to this strand. It offers a different perspective by suggesting how the use of
coarse feedback may result in convergence to non-Nash equilibria, i.e., analogy-based
expectation equilibria. The approach pursued here also starts with the assumption that
a steady state has beenreached. In line with theliterature just mentioned, it would beof
interest to study the convergence properties of the learning process that was suggested
to motivate the present approach.
Finally, there have been various approaches to study how a mechanism designer
should deal with various behavioral biases assumed on agents. These approaches in-
clude, among others, the work of Eliaz (2002), who assumes that a ﬁxed number of
agents may have a crazy behavior, the work of Eliaz and Spiegler (2007), who assume
thatagentsmayhaveerroneoussubjectivebeliefs,andtheworkofCrawfordetal.(2009),
who assume that bidders behave according to the level-k mode of thinking.36 Beyond
the obvious observation that the bias considered in this paper is of a different nature
35Given that there are several possible symmetric conjectures in Esponda’s setup, it is not clear by which
process the bidders should be coordinated on a symmetric self-conﬁrming equilibrium, thereby making
the restriction to symmetric self-conﬁrming equilibrium questionable.
36In a related vein, Matsushima (2008) considers an implementation problem when agents rely on two
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thanthoseconsideredbytheseauthors,Ibelievethecurrentapproachdiffersfromthese
other approaches in an important way. Somehow the bias in the expectation formation
that appears in an analogy-based expectation equilibrium is induced by the choice of
analogy partition made by the designer. It is thus as if the cognitive limitations of the
bidderswereendogenouslycreatedbythedesignerratherthanbeingtheretostartwith.
5.2 Complete information
In the above analysis, some uncertainty about bidders’ valuations was assumed. When
each bidder i’s valuation can take a single value vi, the designer can extract a revenue
equal to RF = maxi(vi vs) in the classic rationality setup.
In the above setup with ex post quitting rights, no manipulation can allow the de-
signer to extract more than RF given that a bidder never accepts paying more than his
valuation if he wins the object (and he never accepts paying anything if he does not win
the object). Thus, within the setup introduced in Section 2, some private information is
required for manipulation to be of effective use to the designer.
5.3 Interim participation constraints
In the above analysis, auction formats with ex post quitting rights were considered. If
participation constraints are required only at the interim stage before bidders know the
outcome of the auction and if relatedly the designer can also require payments from
losers, then the designer can generate much larger revenues if bidders play according to
an analogy-based expectation equilibrium.37
Proposition 5. Suppose there are at least two bidders and that bidders cannot with-
draw from the auction later on. Then by a suitable choice of auction design, the designer
can make arbitrarily large amounts of money.
The idea of the proof, which is detailed in the Appendix, is as follows. By choosing
several formats and by using a format-anonymous analogy partition for say bidder 1,
the designer can mislead bidder 1 in his understanding of the distribution of bids of
other bidders i  = 1. She can then propose a bet to bidder 1, whose monetary outcome
is contingent on the realization of bi, i  = 1, in such a way that the bet sounds proﬁtable
from the viewpoints of both bidder 1 and the designer. By increasing the stakes of the
bet, bidder 1 still agrees on the terms of the bet given our assumption of risk neutrality,
which translates into potentially arbitrarily large revenues for the designer.
Theaboveargumentbearsastrongresemblancetotheobservationthatwithsubjec-
tive prior beliefs, the logic of the no trade theorem breaks down.38 Of course, here since
the designer is assumed to know the correct distributions of bids, one makes the further
37An analogy-based expectation equilibrium can be deﬁned in a similar way as in Deﬁnition 1 for such
auction designs without ex post quitting rights.
38See, however, Morris (1994) for an exploration of when the no trade theorem continues to hold in the
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inference that it is the designer (and not the bidder) who beneﬁts from the bet. Another
key difference with the literature on subjective priors is that the erroneous perception
of the bidders is viewed here as the result of the feedback manipulation of the designer
and not the subjective character of bidders’ prior beliefs.
Comment. To the extent that bidders know that the designer is more informed than
they are about the distributions of bids, one might argue that in the context of the above
manipulation,bidder1mightbesuspicious,therebydecidingtostayoutsidetheauction
roomratherthantoplayaccordingtoananalogy-basedexpectationequilibrium.39 This
is to be contrasted with auction designs with ex post quitting rights as considered in the
main part of this paper in which staying outside the auction room is always a bad idea
(nothing worse can happen by participating). In the class of auction designs with ex
post quitting rights, it is not clear what else (i.e., other than playing according to an
analogy-based expectation equilibrium) a player could do.40
5.4 Further restrictions on the set of mechanisms
RestrictionsonmechanismsbeyondthosemadeinSection2canbeconsidered. Aques-
tion of interest is whether with such extra restrictions, theresults of Propositions 3 and4
still hold. For example, consider the case in which, in addition to the assumptions made
in Section 2,t h ep a y m e n tτk
i (b) made by the winner is required to be in the convex hull
generated by the submitted bids (one might argue that such a feature is satisﬁed by all
auctions in the real world so that the use of other auctions might trigger the suspicion
of bidders). Then clearly, the result of Proposition 4 would a fortiori hold, since I am
restricting the domain on which the designer can choose her auction design. Whether
the result of Proposition 3 still holds should be the subject of a more systematic investi-
gation. I provide a special case in which it would hold and I suspect it might hold much
more generally.
Proposition 6. Suppose there are two bidders whose valuations are uniformly dis-
tributed on [c c + 1] with c>v s + 1. The seller can do strictly better than in Myerson’s
optimal auction in a manipulative auction design with ex post quitting rights in which
the price paid by the winner is constrained to be in between the bids submitted by the two
bidders.
39Alternatively, if one has in mind that there is a risk that bidder 1 would play according to an analogy-
based expectation equilibrium even for large stakes, one may think of the ex post quitting rights scenario
considered in the main part of the paper as a regulatory constraint imposed on designers to better protect
bidders from manipulation.
40Recently, Lehrer (2008) proposed a selection of self-conﬁrming equilibrium based on the most pes-
simistic conjecture (rather than the simplest conjecture as in this paper). Such an approach would lead
bidders not to accept bets as considered in the proof of Proposition 5. But it would also lead bidders not to
take part in any auction of the sort analyzed throughout this paper as long as feedback is partial and there
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5.5 Shill bidding
In the above analysis, the only players in the auction were the bidders i ∈ I.I t m i g h t
be argued that the designer could also employ shill bidders in addition to the real bid-
ders i ∈ I. In the standard paradigm (i.e., relying on Nash equilibrium), this does not
help the designer obtain a better outcome (as results from Myerson’s analysis), but in a
manipulative mechanism design setup it does, as I now illustrate.
Assumethatthedesignercancostlesslyhireshillbidderswhohavenointrinsicvalue
for the object.41 Speciﬁcally, consider the same setup as in Section 2 except that the
designer can also add to the set I ={ 1     n} of actual bidders any set S ={ n + 1     
n+m} ofshillbidders(with 0 valuations). Whenthesellersellstoashillbidder,Iassume
her payoff is vs (this is equivalent to the seller keeping the object and not making any
payment). Otherwise, the seller’s payoff is as in Section 4. That is, her payoff is the
revenue if she sells to a bidder i ∈ I and is vs if she does not sell.
The following proposition shows that in a manipulative auction design with ex post
quitting rights, the seller can get a payoff close to the full information payoff RF when-
ever she can freely hire shill bidders, which should be contrasted with the ﬁnding of
Proposition 4.
Proposition7. Suppose thecost ofhiringshillbidders iszero. Thenthe designer canget
a revenue close to RF in the optimal manipulative auction design.
TheproofofProposition7followsthelogicusedtoproveProposition3. Byinvitingm
shill bidders, the designer can make them bid as she wishes, say each according to a
distribution of bids g(·) with support on (vs d). Consider now a variant of the ﬁrst-price
auction with reserve price vs deﬁned as follows. Only a bidder i∗ ∈ I can win the auction
and he wins if bi∗ = maxi∈I bi and bi∗ ≥ vs. Otherwise, the seller keeps the object. The
shill bidders never win the auction (and thus never make any payment), but they are
requested by the seller to bid according to a distribution of bids with density g(·).42
Consider now the bidder-anonymous analogy partition in the above auction format
in which every bidder gets to know only the aggregate distribution of bids that mixes
the bids of bidders i ∈ I and the bids of shill bidders. It is readily veriﬁed that, in an
analogy-based expectation equilibrium, as m grows to inﬁnity, bidders i ∈ I submit a
bid that is approximately a best response to the conjecture that bidder i ∈ I ={ 1     n}
bids according to g(·) (because in the aggregate distribution of bids that mixes the bids
of all bidders, the distribution of bids of shill bidders overcrowds the distribution of bids
of bidders i ∈ I). That is, each bidder i ∈ I with valuation v>0 submits a bid close to
β(v) ∈ argmaxb≥vs(v − b)Gn(b),w h e r eG(·) is the cumulative of g(·). By considering a
cumulative G(·) of the form G(v) = ((v −vs)/(d −vs))q with q large enough, one easily
obtains that β(v) gets close to v, thereby providing a proof of Proposition 7 (see more
details in the proof of Proposition 3).
41One may argue that in practice the cost of hiring shill bidders is high to the extent that shill bidding is
illegal. The following proposition helps understand why it may be a good idea to make shill bidding illegal.
42Shill bidders are indifferent as to how they bid given the auction rule, but I assume that they follow the
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5.6 Random number of bidders
In the above analysis, the set of bidder I was deterministic (this was also to simplify the
comparison with Myerson’s optimal auction paper). How are the results affected if the
set of bidders I is stochastic?
For concreteness, consider a symmetric regular case in which the valuation of
every bidder i is drawn from the same distribution with density f(·) and v → v −
(1−F(v))/f(v) is increasing. When bidders are risk neutral as assumed in this pa-
per, the best revenue in the classic rationality setup is achieved by having a regular
auction (say a second-price or ﬁrst-price) auction with reserve price R set such that
R − (1−F(R))/f(R) = vs. This is so because such a format would achieve the best rev-
enue even if the number of bidders were known to the designer and no matter what this
number is (see McAfee and McMillan 1987 for the treatment of risk aversion when the
number of bidders is stochastic).
Can the designer achieve larger revenues in a manipulative auction design setup
when the number of bidders is stochastic? The answer is yes and this is shown in the
same way as Proposition 3 was proven, that is, by mixing a little bit of ﬁrst-price auc-
tion with reserve price vs with a well chosen auction format that is strategically equiv-
alent to the second-price auction with reserve price R, and by considering the format-
anonymousanalogypartition. Similarly,Proposition4extendstothestochasticnumber
of bidder case.
In a vein similar to that of Propositions 1 and 2, one might also be interested in sce-
narios in which the number of bidders would vary from one auction to the next and
bidders would observe the number of competitors they face in the current auction. If a
second-price auction is considered, observing the number of competitors has no effect
on the optimal strategy, but if a ﬁrst-price auction is considered, such an observation
affects the optimal strategy (as it is indicative of how the chance of winning depends
on the bid shading). In the latter case, one may also consider the effect of providing as
feedback the distribution of past bids without telling how many bidders were present
in the auction room when the bid was submitted. How does the revenue generated in
such a ﬁrst-price auction design compare to the revenue of the second-price auction?
Addressing such a question is left for future research.
5.7 Cheating on feedback
An important assumption made throughout the paper is that the feedback reported by
the designer must be correct. There are important reasons why I believe this is a natural
assumption. First,inmostcountriesitisillegaltoreportfalsepiecesofinformation(this
should be contrasted with the kind of manipulation considered in this paper in which
every bit of released information is correct even if partial). Second, even if there is no
legislation about the correctness of feedback, it is likely to be in the interest of sellers
to report truthful feedback, as otherwise if bidders realize feedback may be erroneous,
there is no reason why bidders would trust the feedback that is transmitted to them.
Along this line, it may be argued that it is in the interest of an auction house such as
eBay to be committed to never report false feedback to bidders (and it seems clear that
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5.8 Other forms of feedback
Even if the class of feedback considered in this paper is quite large, some forms of feed-
back are not covered. A key difﬁculty should be addressed though if one wishes to con-
sidermoregeneralclassesoffeedback. Thatis,oneneedstodeﬁneanappropriate/focal
notion of best response to the feedback received by the bidder, thereby leading to an ap-
propriate notion of equilibrium. While this may be deﬁned in some cases beyond the
class of feedback considered here (see the discussion at the end of Section 3), I believe
this would be often problematic for general forms of feedback as the feedback would
not easily translate into a focal conjecture about other players’ strategies. In addition, as
already mentioned, considering the whole set of self-conﬁrming equilibria is unlikely to
give sharp predictions in general.
5.9 The replacement assumption
To motivate the analogy-based expectation equilibrium, I have assumed that new bid-
ders participate in each auction (see Section 2.2). It would clearly be of interest to cover
also situations in which each individual bidder remains active longer. When bidders re-
main active arbitrarily long, convergence to Nash equilibrium should be expected in the
private values setup considered here given that in each format Mk bidders could learn
the distribution of other bidders’ bids from their own past observations.43 However, if
each individual bidder does not remain active forever, then some outcome in between
the Nash equilibrium and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (as deﬁned in this
paper) should be expected. More work is required to model such intermediate cases in
a satisfactory way.
6. Conclusion
I believe the above abstract setup is useful to understand a number of applications. The
ideathatbiddersformtheirbeliefsaboutothers’biddingstrategiesbylookingatthehis-
tory of past bids should sound familiar to anyone who has considered buying or selling
on eBay (under the item “completed listings” one has access to the history of previous
bids in auctions of similar objects that took place within a month).44 The feedback pro-
vided on eBay is partial in the sense that one never has access to the characteristics
(such as gender, age, etc.) of the bidders and the same feedback appears whether or
not a buyout option prevailed, as long as the option was not exerted (technically speak-
ing, whether or not there is a buyout option should be interpreted as corresponding to
different auction formats).
What this paper has emphasized is the use of feedback policy as a new instrument
in mechanism design. My main interest was to understand the effect of the feedback
policy on efﬁciency and revenues.
43This is implicitly assuming that players make the best use of their observations. If, however, their
attention is limited, they may still be playing an analogy-based expectation equilibrium in this case.
44See ReynoldsandWooders(2009)forananalysisofauctionswithbuyoutoptions. IamgratefultoJohn
Wooders for introducing me to the various formats and feedback available on eBay.208 Philippe Jehiel Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
The main contribution of this paper is to show that there is a role for a strategic use
of feedback disclosure in mechanism design. On the one hand, ﬁrst-price auctions with
bidder-anonymous analogy partition generate more revenues than second-price auc-
tions when there are two bidders, or more generally, when the revenue of the second-
price auction with symmetrized distributions exceeds the revenue in the second-price
auction(with asymmetricdistributions). Thus, insuchcases, providingcoarsefeedback
in ﬁrst-price auctions may be thought of as a new way to promote more competition
in asymmetric auctions that avoids the cost of reducing efﬁciency. On the other hand,
the insight that with coarse feedback one can generate more revenues than in Myer-
son’s optimal auction is suggestive that the lack of transparency that is often observed
in promotion-like contests may be desirable for organizations. More work is required to
understand more generally how much can be gained with the use of coarse feedback in
mechanism design and how one should regulate such markets to protect consumers.45
Appendix
Proof of Claim 1. Consider a symmetric analogy-based expectation equilibrium β
of A (where β(v) refers to the equilibrium bid of any bidder with valuation v).46 By def-
inition, bidder i plays a best response to the distribution of bids of other bidders that
assigns density
 
j∈I fj(v)/n to the bid β(v). But this is the deﬁnition of a Bayes Nash
equilibrium of  ba(A). The converse is also immediate. 
Proof of Claim 2. Consider an equilibrium β of  fa(A).I n  fa(A), bidder i what-
ever his payment method expects every other bidder j ∈ I to be facing the payment
method k  with probability λk , hence to be playing according to strategy βk 
j (·) with
probability λk .T h u s ,i n  fa(A), when the payment method is k, bidder i plays a best
response βk
i (vi) ∈ argmaxbi uk
i (vi bi;βk
−i),w h e r eβk
j =
 
k  λk βk 
j and βk 
j is the distri-
bution of bids of bidder j when j has the method of payment k . But this corresponds
exactlytothedeﬁnitionofananalogy-basedexpectationequilibriumofA.T h ec o n v e r s e
is also immediate. 
Proof of Proposition 1.
Step 1. Consider the ﬁrst-price auction with bidder-anonymous analogy partition.
There exists a unique analogy-based expectation equilibrium deﬁned as follows: for
i = 1 2, βi(v) = β(v) = (
  v
c xf(x)dx)/F(v),w h e r ef(x)= (f1(x)+f2(x))/2 and F(v)=
(F1(v)+F2(v))/2. Bidders never quit ex post and the outcome is always efﬁcient, i.e., the
bidder who values the good most gets the object.
45For example, there is an active debate as to whether the Swoopo auction site (which currently includes
bids in different currencies as well as bidding fees) should be regulated. In line with the insights developed
in this paper, it might make sense to impose the use of a common currency (as otherwise there is a risk that
bids made in different currencies may be confused when looking at past auctions).
46The anonymity properties of M1 ensure the symmetry (across bidders) of the best response
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Proof. Consider an analogy-based expectation equilibrium βi(·) for i = 1 2.S t a n d a r d
incentive compatibility considerations imply that βi(·) must be a nondecreasing func-
tion of the valuation (as otherwise a higher valuation type of bidder i would perceive
winning the object with a probability strictly lower than a lower valuation type, which is
ruled out by incentive compatibility). Thus, the bid functions βi(·) must be continuous
almost everywhere.
Suppose we have a nonsymmetric equilibrium (that is not equivalent almost ev-
erywhere to a symmetric equilibrium). This implies that for a positive measure of v,
β1(v)  = β2(v) and both β1(v) and β2(v) are best responses for a bidder with valuation v
to the aggregate distribution of bids. There must then be a neighborhood of v within
which a positive measure of v has this property. Yet, this implies that we can make an-
other selection of the best response correspondence that violates the monotonicity of
βi(·), thereby showing a contradiction.47
TherestoftheargumentfollowsfromClaim1(seeSection4). Indeed,anysymmetric
analogy-based expectation equilibrium must be a Nash Bayes equilibrium of the FPA
with symmetric bidders and density f(v), and vice versa. Given the analysis of the FPA
with symmetric bidders, we may conclude as desired. (The fact that bidders never exert
their ex post quitting rights follows from the rules of FPA. No bidder ﬁnds it optimal to
bid above his valuation and thus when he wins, a bidder ﬁnds it optimal to accept the
deal.) 
Call Rtherevenuegeneratedintheﬁrst-priceauctionwithbidder-anonymousanal-
ogy partition. Call RSPA the revenue generated in the second-price auction. Finally,
call R the expected revenue generated in the second-price auction with symmetric bid-
ders and density of valuations f(v)= (f1(v)+f2(v))/2. These revenues are written as


























47Suppose β1(v) < β2(v).B y c o n t i n u i t y , β1(v + ε) < β2(v) and β2(v + ε) > β1(v). The deﬁnition of
an analogy-based expectation equilibrium implies that b1(v) = β2(v) and b1(v + ε) = β1(v + ε) with all
other bids unchanged should also be part of an equilibrium. But such bids would violate the incentive
compatibility conditions and as a result cannot maximize (over bids) the corresponding expected payoffs
of bidder 1 with valuations v and v +ε.210 Philippe Jehiel Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)



















where the last equality is obtained by integration by parts (noting that F1(v)−F2(v) = 0
for v = c and d). 




























where the last equality is obtained by integration by parts (noting that F1(v)−F2(v) = 0
for v = c and d). 
Observe that dβ(v)/dv > 0 for all v.H e n c e , Proposition 1 follows from Steps 1, 2,
and 3. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We proceed in the same way as for Proposition 1,a n d
deﬁne R as the revenue generated in the ﬁrst-price auction with bidder-anonymous
feedback partition, RSPA as the revenue generated in the second-price auction, and R
as the expected revenue generated in the second-price auction with symmetric bid-
ders and density of valuations f(v)= (f1(v)+···+fn(v))/n. We also denote by β(v)
the equilibrium bidding strategy in the ﬁrst-price auction in which the densities are
f(v)= (f1(v)+···+fn(v))/n. We denote by
H(v)= F1(v)···Fn(v)
and
Hsym(v) = F(v)n 
where Fi(v) is the cumulative of v according to fi(·) and F(v)is the cumulative of v ac-
cording to f(·).Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Manipulative auction design 211





















Given that Hsym(v) ≥ H(v) due to the concavity of x → lnx and given that β(·) is
increasing, we conclude that R ≥ R. Proposition 2 follows. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We start with the following observation.
Step 1. Myerson’s optimal auction can be implemented while satisfying the ex post quit-
ting rights of the bidders in a direct truthful mechanism in which reporting the truth is a
weakly dominant strategy for every bidder.
Proof. This is easily shown by simple adaptation of the second-price auction to the
optimal auction of Myerson. In the asymmetric regular case, the functions ci(vi) =
vi − (1−Fi(vi))/fi(vi) are increasing in vi, and the optimal auction requires allocating
the object to bidder i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈I ci(vi) whenever ci∗(vi∗)>v s (and otherwise the seller
shouldkeeptheobject). Thisisachievedinadirectmechanismimplementableindomi-
nant strategy in which bidder i∗ is requiredtopay maxj =i[c−1
i (cj(vj)) c−1
i (vs)].I ti se a s i l y
checked that this payment is always less than vi∗ by the monotonicity of ci(·). A similar
construction can be achieved in general (not necessarily regular) in which intervals of
valuations are treated alike.48 
The rest of the argument goes as follows. Consider a monotonic bijection ψ from
[c d] into itself and let Mψ be the mechanism obtained from the mechanism MD iden-
tiﬁed in Step 1 as follows: in Mψ, every bidder i submits a bid bi and mechanism MD
is applied to the proﬁle of announcements (ψ(bi))n
i=1. Clearly, Mψ falls in the class of
admissible mechanisms and reporting ψ−1(vi) for bidder i with valuation vi is a weakly
dominant strategy. Besides, Mψ achieves Myerson’s optimal auction revenues and no
bidder is willing to exercise his ex post quitting rights in Mψ.
Consider now the following auction design. Format Mψ is used with probability
1 − ε and the ﬁrst-price auction with vs reserve price referred to as FPA is used with
probability ε. Besides, bidders get to know only the aggregate distribution of bids of all
bidders across both formats. That is, we consider the bidder-anonymous and format-
anonymous analogy partitions in which for all i,
 
(j k){(j k)} forms the unique analogy
class of Pi. We show that for a suitable choice of ε and ψ, this auction design generates
48One can easily perturb the format so as to make incentives strict in all cases (even in the nonregular
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strictly more expected payoff to the seller than Myerson’s optimal auction. First, we ob-
serve that the payoff generated in this auction design can be written as (1−ε)Rψ +εR∗,
where Rψ is the expected payoff generated in this auction design when Mψ prevails and
R∗ is the corresponding expected payoff when FPA prevails. It is clear that Rψ is equal to
Myerson’s optimal auction payoff RM, since the behaviors in Mψ are unaffected by the
rest of the auction design given that bidders have (weakly) dominant strategies in Mψ.
Thus, it sufﬁces to show that R∗ >R M for suitable choices of ε and ψ.






d −  c
 nm/(n+1)
for some  c>v s and m.
In the limit case in which ε = 0, the (perceived) optimal bid in FPA for a bidder with
valuation v>v s is argmaxb>vs(v − b)((b−  c)/(d−  c))m as ((b−  c)/(d−  c))m represents
theperceivedprobabilitythatallotherbidders’bidsarebelowb. Thisexpressionismax-
imized at bopt such that
bopt −  c =
m
m+1
(v −  c) 
Let b∗ besuchthat b∗−  c = m/(m+2)(v−  c)andconsider ε>0. Abidderwithvaluation
v>v s perceives getting at most
(1−ε)(v −b∗)
 
b∗ −  c
d −  c
 m
+ε(v −  c) (3)
by bidding b<b ∗.
By bidding bopt, a bidder with valuation v>v s perceives getting at least
(1−ε)(v −bopt)
 
bopt −  c
d −  c
 m
  (4)
Hence, whenever (4)i sl a r g e rt h a n( 3) we can be sure that a bidder with valuation v
bids no less than  c +m/(m+2)(v −  c). The difference between (4)a n d( 3) is written as
 (v) = (1−ε)
(v −  c)m+1















−ε(v −  c) 
Giventhat1/(m+1)(m/(m+1))m−2/(m+2)(m/(m+2))m > 0,thisallowsustoob-
tain Step 2.
Step 2. ∀v >  c, ∀m, ∃ε>0 such that ∀ε<ε, ∀v>v,  (v) > 0.
From Step 2 and the above considerations, we infer that for all v>v , bFPA(v) −  c>
m/(m+2)(v −  c) in the above auction design as deﬁned by ψ and ε<ε.T h e c o r r e -
sponding value of R∗ converges to the full information revenue RF as m converges to
49It is clear that such ψ exists and satisﬁes ψ(c) = c and ψ(d) = d.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Manipulative auction design 213
inﬁnity and v converges to  c. It follows that one can ﬁnd m large enough,  c close enough
to vs, v close enough to   c,a n dε>0 so that R∗ >R M. This completes the proof of the
proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider an auction design assumed to deliver an expected
payoff that is ε-close to RF. We show that this is not possible for ε small enough.
To simplify the notation, we consider the case of two symmetric bidders i = 1 2 and
we allow only for auction designs with format-anonymous analogy partitions. The ar-
gument easily generalizes to the n asymmetric bidder case with arbitrary analogy parti-
tions (by restricting attention tothose formats thatarepooledtogetherinto one analogy
class of say bidder i).
Observe that in all formats, whenever vj <v s,w em u s th a v eβk
j (vj)<v s given the
payment rules of the auction (and the fact that there is a tiny cost to cancelling the
transaction). We further let γ = Pr(vj <v s j = i) > 0 and let  k(v) denote the expected
revenue loss incurred by the designer in format Mk when bidder i has valuation v as
compared with the full information case.
Let m be large enough and let e<1
2 Pr((d +vs)/3 <v j <( d+vs)/2).D e ﬁ n e
d >( d+vs)/3 such that e = Pr(d <v i <( d+vs)/2). Finally, let f = min(Pr(vi >









  k(v) < η and  k(v )<η
 
 
Given that the auction design delivers an expected payoff that is ε-close to RF,i ti sr e a d -
ily veriﬁed that
 
k∈ λk ≥ 1−1/m.
Perceived equilibrium payoff
We note that for v>d ,i f k(v) < η, then a bidder with valuation v should in for-
mat Mk win whenever bj <v s (which happens with probability γ)a n dp a ya tl e a s t
v − η/γ. By monotonicity of the payment rule, this implies that in Mk, bidder i with






(the payment when i wins, bids bi,a n dbj >v s must be at least as large as when i wins,
bids bi,a n dbj <v s).
We also note that  k(v) < η implies that in Mk, bidder i with valuation v should win
against some vj ∈ (d (d+vs)/2) with probability at least 1 − η/(fv) = 1 − mεγ/(f2v).
We choose ε small enough so that this probability is no less than 1
2.
Perceived equilibrium from downward deviation
Onecanrankthevarious k ∈   bydecreasingorderof βk((d +vs)/3) andlet r denote




k∈ λk. We denote by  sup the formats in   that correspond to the ﬁrst r formats in
this induced order.
Consider k ∈  sup and let v  ∈ (d (d+vs)/2),  k(v )<η .C o n s i d e r a n y v>
(3d +vs)/4 and let v submit a bid bi = βk
i (v ). Bidder i with valuation v in format Mk214 Philippe Jehiel Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
must perceive to be winning with probability at least 1
4(1−m)Pr(vj <( d+vs)/3),50 and
he must be paying at most d/2 whenever he wins.51 Given that v>( 3d +vs)/4 (and thus
(3d+vs)/4−(d +vs)/2 = (d −vs)/4), overall such a deviation makes bidder i feel he can
get at least 1
2(1−m)(d/4)Pr(vj <( d+vs)/3) in Mk.
Given that ε c a nb ec h o s e ns ot h a tmε/f < 1
2(1 − m)(d/4)Pr(vj <( d+vs)/3),w eg e t
a contradiction to the deﬁnition of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium (since a
bidder should obviously feel that his perceived payoff obtained by following his equi-
librium strategy is no less than his perceived payoff obtained by following any other
strategy). 
Proof of Proposition 5. We consider the following formats M1 and M2, both used
with probability 1
2. In both formats, the good is never allocated whatever the bids,
ϕk
i (b) = 0 for all i, b and k = 1 2. In format M1, bidder 1 wins ε if b1 = 1 and 0 otherwise.
In format M2, bidder 1 wins ε if b1 = 2 and 0 otherwise. In format M2, bidder 2 pays







A/2 if (b1 b2) = (2 1)
−A if (b1 b2) = (1 1)
0 if (b1 b2)  = (2 1) (1 1)
and the analogy partition is the anonymous-format analogy partition.
Clearly, in this auction design, bidder 1 bids b1 = 1 in M1 and b1 = 2 in M2.G i v e n
that λ1 = λ2 = 1
2 and the format-anonymous analogy partition is being used, bidder 2
believes that in M2, bidder 1 bids b1 = 1 or 2, each with probability 1
2. Based on this
belief, bidder 2 ﬁnds it optimal to bid b2 = 1 in M2 (because 1
2(A−A/2)>0).
Insuchananalogy-basedexpectationequilibrium,thedesignergetsarevenueequal
to −ε in M1 and A/2 − ε in M2, so an overall expected revenue of A/4 − ε. Since A can
be chosen arbitrarily large, we get the desired result. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider the format-anonymous analogy partition in the
auction design in which a share 1 − ε of SPA is mixed with ε of the format M(η μ) in
which the bidder with the highest bid, say bidder 1 if b1 >b 2, wins the auction and pays
ap r i c e
τ(b1 b2) = (1−η(1+μb2))b2 +η(1+μb2)b1 
(Note that as η = 0, M(η μ)is the second-price auction.)
50This is because in the format-anonymous feedback partition, all the bids βk 
j (vj) with vj <( d+vs)/3
and k  ∈   \  sup ∪{ r} must be below βk
i (v ), and by construction   \  sup ∪{ r} has a probability at least
1
2(1−m).M o r e o v e ri nMk, i with valuation v should win against some v  ∈ (d (d+vs)/2) with a probability
at least 1
2 (see above), and thus by the monotonicty of ϕk
i (b) with respect to bj, he should also win against
all bids that are below βi
k(d) with a probability at least 1
2.
51This is because he is mimicking type v  who never pays more than v  when he wins.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Manipulative auction design 215
We subtract c from all bids and valuations. As ε tends to 0, in format M(η μ),a









given that bidders expect bids to be uniformly distributed on (0 1).T h e r e v e n u e s o

























Thus, there must exist μ>0 and η>0 sufﬁciently small so that R(η μ) > 0. The ma-
nipulative design as described above with ε sufﬁciently small induces a strictly higher
revenue than the second-price auction. Given that the revenue in the second-price auc-
tion is the optimal revenue by Myerson’s analysis, we conclude as desired (observe that
for η and μ small enough, η(1 + μx) ∈ (0 1) so that M(η μ) belongs to the required
space of mechanisms). 
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